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a. Introduction and Goal   
The research reported here attempts to understand how language may have
originated from sensori-motor competences. Recently the observation of
mirror neurons [1] has lead to the suggestion that there is not only a
rich representation of motor action but also that this representation
is used for multiple purposes: action execution, action planning,
action imaging, and action recognition. Of particular importance is the
observation that one agent can recognise an action plan of another one
and that the same neurons are involved.    
The relevance of this for the origins of language has been pointed out
by Rizzolatti and Arbib [2].  Here we go a step further, arguing that
the meaning of a language utterance in general is a series of physical
or mental actions that the speaker wants the hearer to perform, rather
than a declarative statement to be stored whose only relevance are its
truth conditions. For example, when a speaker says "Can you give me the
black box on the table?",  he wants the hearer to hand over an object
(which  means to grasp it and move it in the direction of  the
speaker). To know which object is involved, the speaker wants the
hearer to direct his or her attention to a table in the shared context,
to identify the objects which can be compared to the prototype of a
box, and then focus on the one box which has a black colour. These
mental actions are as situated and grounded as motor actions like
grasping.
From this action-oriented view of language semantics, language
understanding amounts to the recognition of the plan intended by the
hearer and the utterance is seen as giving hints about which plan is
intended.  The production of an utterance can also be seen as involving
the contruction of an action plan and thus parsing amounts to the
recognition of which production plans have been used by the speaker. So
the production of an utterance, both the conceptualisation of what to
say and the decision on how to say it, can be viewed as the planning of
a series of actions, and the interpretation of an utterance can be seen
as the recognition of these action patterns and their subsequent
execution.   
Taking this point of view has two important implications:  (1) It helps
to understand how language might have originated.  If the mechanisms
required for language are essentially the same as those required for
motor planning, execution, and recognition, then it is less a mystery
how homo sapiens could have started to evolve language. We no longer
need a scenario based on genetic mutations (as in [5]) but can assume a
pre-adaptation scenario, in which existing brain structures and
processes became used for language communication.  (2) It leads to a
greater overall economy of the human cognitive system because fewer
special-purpose components (like a dedicated language organ) are
needed.    
To demonstrate the theoretical viability of this thesis  we have to
show that the same representational  framework is adequate for sensori-
motor behavior and  both for the conceptualisation and interpretation
of utterances and  for the verbal behavior itself (the production and
recognition  of utterances). We also have to show that the same
learning mechanisms are involved. This is obviously a very non-trivial
exercise given the complexity involved.    
b. Materials and methods  
So far, we have been developing formal models and have conducted
computer simulations and experiments with physical robots to test them.
The robots have a sensori-motor layer for executing autonomous
behaviors, and a fully integrated cognitive layer for planning, memory,
and communication. The robot bodies in our experiments range in
complexity from steerable cameras [3] to small mobile robots, animal-
like robots (specifically the dog-shaped SONY AIBO), and humanoid
torsos.    
The robots play language games, either among themselves or with a human
player. Each language game is a situated interaction between at least
two agents about something in their shared environment. It involves
perception, conceptualisation, communication, interpretation, and
action.  
An example game that we have used extensively is the guessing game, in
which the speaker draws the attention of the hearer to an object in the
shared reality by verbal means [3]. In one large-scale experiment, a
growing population of close to 3000 (virtual) agents was employed which
used the (real) robot bodies to engage in guessing games about scenes
consisting of geometrical figures on a white board in front of them.
Another example game that we have used extensively is the "Where-Is-
It?" game, in which agents locate objects based on a spatial map
acquired by exploring and remembering the environment and verbal
suggestions of a path to follow.   
The first step in our research has been to operationalise a
representational framework of actions and action plans in the form of
schemata. Each schema has a number of slots, constraints on each slot,
and an action plan in the form of augmented finite state machines. The
automaton schedules and de-schedules sensori-motor behaviors and moves
from one state to another based on success or failure in behavior
execution. The constraints are maintained by propagating information as
fast as it becomes available using data-flow computation. A schema may
itself be a specialisation of a more abstract schema and may call upon
other schemas.  This representational framework was demonstrated to  be
adequate for the actual high level control of  grounded robotic
behaviors. We have also developed a learning system capable to acquire
new motor schemata  by the exploration of a search space of possible
concatentations of the primitive actions and by a chunking of
successful  paths.   
Our second step has been to use the same framework to plan the meaning
of natural language utterances as needed for language games. The
primitive actions in this case are operations over cognitive spaces,
such as filtering a set into a subset, shifting the focus of attention
from one object to another, or ordering the members of a set into a
sequence and retrieving the first member. These conceptual schemata are
tightly coupled with the sensori-motor layer in the sense that the
information items and facts used by them have all been deposited in
memory by  sensori-motor behaviors and are continuously upgraded by
them.  
The third step has been to use the same framework for the execution and
the recognition of the utterances themselves.  The primitive actions of
verbal schemata center on the production (or recognition) of parts of
utterances in a specific order and on the realisation of suprasegmental
modulations such as prosody and stress patterns. The planning of verbal
behavior is itself a highly complex process and known to be distinct
from the actual execution of the plan. We are interested in natural
dialogues which are highly situated in the specific interaction context
of speaker and hearer, with many false starts, hesitations, irrelevant
words, etc. This makes verbal behavior much closer to sensori-motor
behavior than is usually assumed, particularly by linguistic theories
that exclusively lok at "clean" written language.    
Finally we have developed a two-way associative memory that is mapping
conceptual schemata to verbal schemata. While parsing an utterance the
hearer must recognise which verbal schemata wre involved and map them
to the conceptual schemata that could have been intended by the
speaker. While producing an utterance the speaker must conceptualise
what he wants to say in terms of conceptual schemata and map them onto
verbal  schemata that constitute a plan for how to express the meaning.
We have been experimenting with memory-based learning techniques to
gradually build up the repertoire of form-meaning mappings [4].    
c. Results  
At this point we have been able to demonstrate the complete
architecture on autonomous robotic agents. For example, in the large-
scale experiment alluded to earlier [3], we have observed that a stable
communication system based on a vocabulary of a few thousand words
indeed emerges and is maintained in the population even if new members
continuously enter or leave the system. A self-organising semiotic
dynamics has been observed damping synonymy and polysemy due to a
positive  feedback loop between use and success [5].
These grammatical forms express the conceptual plans made by the
speaker and  recognised by the hearer.   Even though a vast amount of
work is still required to enrich the schema repertoires by the addition
of more primitive actions and by integrating more complex learning
mechanisms, we can say that based on the results so far the original
thesis has gained in plausibility. The planning and plan execution
mechanisms required for  sensori-motor behavior can form the basis of
language.  
d. Conclusions  
The Action Theory of the origins of language argues that there is a
very tight analogy between the ability to plan and recognise a  motor
action and the ability to plan and recognise  an utterance, both its
content (what  to say) and its form (how to say it). Our research is
developing in full detail this analogy by operationalising it on
physical robots. We believe that such experimentation is complementary
to neurobiological observation and a potentially rich source for
detailed models of human verbal behavior.    
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